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Introduction 
It is almost a commonplace that Structural Funds (SF) have a significant impact on 
public administration, especially in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun-
tries where the absorption of EU subsidies is one of the most important policy and 
political ambitions. However, the governance regime of Structural Funds is a con-
siderable challenge, since traditional government structures and practices in the 
CEE countries do not typically harmonise with the principles of decentralisation or 
regionalism, partnership, efficiency, transparency and strategic integrative plan-
ning. Therefore, CEE countries have tried to adapt to these challenges in different 
ways; institutionally by implementing internal structural reforms of public admin-
istration (learning) and/or by establishing separate, “unfamiliar” structures and 
institutions to better fit the SF system (imitating), besides functional changes in the 
instrumental model and processes. The main question was whether it is better to 
develop an internal institutional system and integrate it into the national admin-
istration in a way corresponding to EU regulations, or to build a new SF institution 
separated from the national governmental structure, so that the SF institution thus 
created fully fits the European requirements.  
For comparison we have chosen four “Visegrad” countries, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, representing special Central and Eastern European 
answers to the institutionalisation pressure of the Structural Funds. All of them 
accessed to the EU at the same time, still they have had different SF managing struc-
tures. 
Having very few own resources for development, the proper utilisation of EU 
resources has been one of the most important political objectives in the Visegrad 
countries. This strong financial dependence greatly influenced the institutional sys-
tem established for the utilisation of the pre-accession, then the structural and the 
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cohesion funds. Namely, in the course of shaping the institutional system, the EU 
regulations had to be respected which, however, were changing over time together 
with the aims and tools of the EU’s cohesion policy. From the very beginning the 
Visegrad countries were “shooting at moving targets” as regards both the objectives 
to be supported and the national SA managements established to effectively allocate 
the resources (Figure 1). 
In 2004 all four Visegrad countries acceded to the European Union as full mem-
bers, but in respect of some funds the new members became only partially “equal” 
to the old ones. Suffice to mention here, for example, the gradual introduction of 
agricultural direct payments between 2004 and 2013, or the practice of so-called 
capping. Moreover, the Visegrad co-operation was not an active integration at the 
time of the accession negotiations, which is clearly reflected in the fact that these 
four countries managed to achieve different conditions in the course of negotiating 
 
 
Figure 1. The research areas’ categorisation, 2004–2013 
Key: 1 – Cohesion Regions and Objective 1 areas; 2 – Competitiveness and Employment Re-
gions and Objective 2 areas; 3 – Competitiveness and Employment Regions and before 2007 
Objective 1 areas; 4 – National boundaries; 5 – NUTS 2 boundaries. 
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with the EU. Thus in 2013 the close co-operation of the four Visegrad countries was 
a surprise and it led to getting additional sums from the cohesion fund for each 
country. 
Co-operation among the four Visegrad countries has varied in the course of his-
tory. There were periods of close co-operation as well as loose relations, sometimes 
getting to the brink of disintegration, which were obviously influenced by the for-
eign and minority policies of the political elites in power in these countries. 
For a long time the EU dealt with not only these four countries but also the whole 
Eastern Bloc as a single unit, the so-called eastern issue. The East European policy 
of the EU also influenced the Visegrad co-operation. Although these countries have 
very different characteristics in respect of their public administration structure, eco-
nomic dependence, settlement network and the role of their borders, it was only 
lately that they ceased to appear as one unit on the EU’s map. 
The four examined countries also differ in the way they have shaped their SA 
institutional system, following completely different ideas and having diverse admin-
istration structures. The creation of SF management commenced in these countries 
at a time when EU cohesion policy seemed to prefer regions and was definitely 
favouring decentralisation. In 2004 the slogan of “Europe of regions” was already 
waning, but it still held true that the richer countries were federal, whereas the 
poorer ones were rather centralised. The EU regulations relating to SF management 
did not require decentralisation and – as it turned out – they contained several ele-
ments which could easily be “fulfilled” ostensibly. Some countries chose this easier 
way, while others launched organic changes with thorough work. The former ones 
were the so-called imitating countries, while the latter ones undertook to go through 
a learning process. Let us have a look how it happened. 
Public Administration Reforms 
While in general the European Union considers the structure and functioning of pub-
lic administration as a national internal affair, it has established a fairly strong 
adaptation pressure by regulating the rules of utilisation of the Structural Funds 
(Pálné Kovács 2009). From the perspective of territorial governance it is an im-
portant question, because this pressure on administrative reforms was simulta-
neous with SF management building in each Central and Eastern European Member 
State (EU 12). The Structural Fund’s relative importance is particularly high in the 
CEE countries where the SF have virtually replaced the domestic development 
policy, determining the national contributions and the national development 
resources. The SF in these countries significantly exceed the volume of national de-
velopment resources regulated by non-EU rules. Therefore, the role of the SF is 
much more dominant in these cases than in the old Member States, and thus these 
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funds serve as an instrument to promote multi-level and participative governance 
in the new Member States. That is why preparation for the Structural Funds was 
able to influence the administrative reforms in the CEE countries to such a high 
degree.  
For example, the significant change in the Polish regional policy model was 
introduced when the comprehensive territorial reform came into force; there we 
can see a real learning process. On the other hand, Hungary only imitated the insti-
tutional reforms by having built separate SF institutions which have not been inte-
grated into the public administration system. While in Poland and in the Czech 
Republic the public administration reforms have created self-governing regions, the 
so-called voivodeships at NUTS 2 and krajsat NUTS 3 levels, Slovakia and Hungary 
have only built planning regions at NUTS 2 level, transferring the administrative ad-
justment to these scales. The situation is contradictory in the Czech Republic, as 
instead of the NUTS 3 level institutions having self-governance and regional 
development tasks, one has to deal with 8 planning-statistical regions in the case of 
SF management. In contrast to this, the situation in Poland is ideal as everything can 
be found at the NUTS 2 level (Figure 2). 
This diverse set of regional institutions and frameworks demonstrates that the 
scope for implementing EU Cohesion Policy varies greatly (Bachtler–McMaster, 
2008). While the Polish NUTS 2 level forms a rational basis for regional Structural 
Funds programmes, in the other investigated countries the NUTS 2 regions contain 
more than one self-governing units. 
During the reference years (2004–2013) partnership became one of the key 
principles of EU support policy. It means multi-tier (sub-national, national, suprana-
tional) and multi-actor (local and regional authorities, private and civil organisa-
tions) participation of partners in policy-making, planning, implementation, moni-
toring and evaluation (EP 2008). The system of multilevel governance, the degree of 
decentralisation and participation in decision-making and power, however, varies 
among the analysed countries and also among regions within a country. The legacy 
of centralism, the lack of traditions of working in partnership, and the weakly insti-
tutionalised sub-national authorities in the CEE countries raise questions about the 
transferability of the partnership approach to the new member states, the main re-
cipients of cohesion funding (Dąbrowski, 2011). 
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Figure 2: The Visegrad countries’ public administration systems and their relationship with 
the NUTS 2 regions  
Key: 1 – Country boundary; 2 – Boundary of NUTS 2 (planning or self–governing – regions; 
3 – Boundary of NUTS 3 self–governing regions. 
Policy Co-ordination 
Domestic Regional Policy 
In the 2007–2013 period each Visegrad country prepared a national development 
plan, called National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF), agreed on by the Mem-
ber States and the Commission, setting the investment priorities for the regional and 
sectoral programmes to be supported by the European Union in the given program-
ming period. The SF management institutions are responsible for ensuring com-
pliance with the objectives of the national development plan, which should be con-
sistent with the EU’s balanced development requirement. That is why the planning 
section of the national development plans and the implementation of the national 
programmes are both important in the CEE countries.  
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There are two main forms in the CEE countries’ practice of supporting the bal-
anced development of a territory through domestic regional development manage-
ment and implementation. In the first model the special regional development 
“sectoral institution” (ministry) is responsible for regional development tasks, while 
another, a supra-ministerial institution is responsible for inter-sectoral co-
ordination, that is, for the “horizontal” enforcement of the territorial approach. In 
this case the central administration of regional development is divided between two 
institutions. In the second model there is a top ministry which performs the manage-
ment and planning of development policy as a whole, including domestic regional 
and inter-sectoral development.  
These models varied over time and from country to country. For example, in 
Hungary the first model was built between 2008 and 2010, but before and after that 
Hungary can be considered a sample country of the second (divided) solution, as the 
tasks of planning and implementing regional development had been and have again 
become separated into two ministries. In Slovakia a top ministry of regional de-
velopment (the Ministry of Construction and Regional Development) has been func-
tioning since1999, although from 2010 to 2012 the tasks of the ministry were 
divided (mostly) between two ministries and the Prime Minister’s Office. Since 1996 
the Czech and since 2005 the Polish practice can be classified as the second, inte-
grated type, where regional development ministries have been responsible for 
regional development. 
Integration of SF Management 
As regards the compliance of SF institutions with the domestic public administration 
systems, two models can be identified. In the integrated model the planning, imple-
menting, monitoring and evaluating institutions and procedures are not distinct 
from the domestic development institutions and procedures. On the other hand, in 
the separated model there are parallel SF and public administration institutions. 
This model includes varying degrees of administrative integration (using existing 
administrative bodies), namely, the integration of programming (the EU pro-
grammes are integrated partly into domestic development policy implementation), 
and financial integration (using funds according to the national accounting rules). It 
may appear therefore as a mixed model, like the Hungarian one (Perger 2009). 
From 2004 to 2006 the Polish SF management system was an integrated one. 
The managing authorities were located at different Operational Programmes (OPs) 
in different ministries. At the Integrated Regional Operational Programme (IROP) 
the Ministry of Economy, Labour and Social Policy of Poland (which was the central 
body of SF management until 2005) was responsible for co-operation with the self-
governments of 16 voivodeships, and voivodeship offices were the intermediate 
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bodies. Since 2005, and of course during the new programming period, the Polish 
regional development top ministry has been responsible for both domestic regional 
policy and SF programme implementation. The managing, intermediate, certifying 
and auditing bodies are integral parts of the national public administration system. 
In the new programming period regional self-governments have become the 
managing authorities of the 16 new Regional Operational Programmes (ROPs) in 
Poland. These voivodeships are responsible for the domestic regional development 
tasks, too, so it is an integrated model also at a regional level.  
In the period between 2004 and 2006 Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary 
also had an integrated system for SF management. Usually the sectoral ministries 
were the managing authorities, and they made decisions about support. While the 
Slovakian and Czech systems remained integrated, the Hungarian SF institutional 
system became separated in the new programming period (2007–2013). SF plan-
ning, implementation and management became the tasks of the National Develop-
ment Agency (NDA) which is now subordinated to the National Development 
Ministry, separated from the traditional public administration organisations. 
However, this system is rather a sample of the mixed model, characterised by the 
integration of the SF institutions’ programming and financing, but with administra-
tive separation. The NDA, in co-operation with the ministries concerned, is respon-
sible for the planning and implementation of the entire NSRF as well as for the 
managing authority functions with respect to all operational programmes, including 
the regional ones. However, from 2014 on, SF management will again be the task of 
the ministries involved, thus becoming integrated once more. 
Involvement of Self-governing Regions 
Here we are going to analyse the centralised and the decentralised public admin-
istration bodies’ role in programming and implementation. In the decentralised 
model the regional actors have an important role in the process of planning, 
programming and implementing ROPs. They make decisions about the allocation of 
the ROPs. In contrast, in the classical form of the centralised model the central state 
administration bodies are responsible for planning, implementing and managing the 
whole SF programme, including the ROPs. Though these central bodies may involve 
regional partners in the planning process, it still remains centralised, as are the 
managing authorities (Perger 2009). The centralised SF managing system can in-
crease the efficiency of co-ordinating the implementation of OPs and improve trans-
parency, but from the point of view of territorial governance, this solution provides 
fewer opportunities for the regional actors.  
The scope of action in financing is one of the most significant elements among 
the conditions of territorial governance. Authorisation in itself is not sufficient to 
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guarantee effective scope of action, financial autonomy is also required which, 
however, is deficient among the CEE countries’ actors at regional level. 
During the first programming period (2004–2006) the Polish SF management 
system was the most decentralised model in the Visegrad countries, since Poland 
has a decentralised state administration system with self-governing NUTS 2 regions. 
The new three-level territorial structure with large voivodeships was introduced in 
1999. The regional is an administrative level with the government’s local repre-
sentatives, but there are also elected self-governments of the voivodeships, with 
their own budget and competencies. This new regional self-governmental frame-
work corresponds to the NUTS 2 level which served as a basis for preparing the re-
quired institutional system of European Cohesion Policy in Poland. The territorial 
structural changes carried out made the management of regional development pos-
sible at the regional level from 2007. Essentially, due to the IROP (2004–2006), 
regional institutional capacity was successfully set up at the voivodeships. Thus, in 
the new programming period, the decentralisation of SF management could become 
deeper, as the 16 ROPs and their management by the regional self-governments 
justify it (MRD 2011). The Polish practice shows that development policy can be 
transferred from the state administration to the self-governments, which has 
increased the policy’s legitimacy and integration.  
From the point of view of territorial governance, it is a problem that public 
finances for regional development have remained centralised in Poland despite the 
so-called regional contracts signed by the regional self-governments and the 
Ministry. As an evaluation study explains, the impact of European Cohesion policy 
on the Polish multi-level governance system goes far beyond financing. The system 
needs the further enhancement of co-operation across levels among government, 
municipalities and public and private actors. There are also other challenges, like 
capacity-building at local-governmental level (competent and efficient public 
officials), and performance monitoring and policy impact assessment at both local 
and central levels (Kramer – Kołodziejski 2011). 
The Czech SF management system was centralised in the first programming 
period, as the Ministry of Regional Development managed the IROP programme. For 
the new programming period, 9 regional OPs were created, 2 for Prague and 7 for 
the cohesion regions. At the cohesion regions the Regional Councils, funded directly 
for the ROPs management in 2006, were the Managing Authorities, while in Prague 
a department of the City Hall had the same function. The Regional Councils (Boards), 
consisting of representatives from all regional assemblies (NUTS 3) within the NUTS 
2 regions, have their own offices for the management and implementation of ROPs. 
The Hungarian and Slovakian SF managements were centralised in the period 
between 2004 and 2006. The reason for this was their centralised state administra-
tion system, and it was an EU expectation that programme structure should be 
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single, transparent and centralised (Perger, 2009). The new Slovakian territorial 
governments had no role in NSRF planning (Buček, 2011); by contrast, the 
Hungarian Regional Development Councils, established by the Regional Develop-
ment Act and operating from 1999, were able to prepare regional development 
strategies. Finally, due to pressure from the EU, Hungary made one single ROP, 
which relied only partially on regional plans. Slovakia, however, had no regional 
programme at all, only a sectoral OP with regional elements.  
After 2007 the Hungarian model, with 7 separated ROPs but with a centralised 
managing authority (NDA), became more centralised, though the RDAs were the 
intermediate bodies of the ROPs. However, the Slovakian system is even more 
centralised. Except for the City of Bratislava, the regional self-governments (krajs) 
are partly involved in the implementation of SF, since each one is an intermediate 
organisation in the Integrated Regional Operational Programme. In the Bratislava 
OP the city self-government is the intermediate body (Buček 2011). 
Hungarian regionalists hoped that top-down regionalisation could be imple-
mented, first when the Regional Development Act was born, then at the time of 
elaborating the national development plans in the early 2000s (these had regional 
dimensions, too, and there were multi-level discussions about the plans). But RDCs 
and RDAs had a negligible role in the allocation of the national development 
resources from the beginning (1996) to 2008. It was negligible because the amount 
of decentralised domestic regional development funds was very small. From 2012, 
when RDCs were abolished, the county governments remained the only spatial 
development and planning actors; they had been involved in elaborating regional 
development strategies, but they were not experienced in co-ordination. Since that 
time the local self-governments have lost many of their functions which have been 
transferred to the county level “deconcentrated” state administration. Besides this 
recentralisation, the RDAs, as SF institutional and regional development actors, have 
also become centralised organs. 
Challenges for the Visegrad Countries 
One of the biggest challenges of adaptation was the so-called Europeanisation pres-
sure, especially regionalisation. The extensive effect of the SF on national admin-
istrations in the CEE countries can be explained by their strong motivation to 
acquire development resources eligible for less developed regions. The CEE coun-
tries were preparing for accession at that time and they believed that regions mat-
tered. The main argumentation for the necessity of regionalisation stemmed from 
SF regulations, although the criteria of “good governance” formulated and con-
trolled yearly by the European Commission implied the indirect message to decen-
tralise and develop the “regional administrative capacities” (Pálné Kovács 2011). 
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The CEE countries tried to adapt to the tasks deriving from the Europeanisation pro-
cess. The motivation to gain access to SF played the most significant role in this, but 
there were no strict regulations for the establishment of administrative regions. The 
necessary elements of SF-driven adaptation were (1) the delimitation of the NUTS 2 
regions; (2) the establishment of regional consultative bodies based on the princi-
ples of partnership, and also (3) that of the managing authorities of SF (Pálné 
Kovács, 2011). Poland was the “eminent student” among the Visegrad countries, 
while the others used the freedom of adaptation not for real, but for imitated region-
alisation.  
The system of objectives of regional policy; the requirements concerning the insti-
tutional system of the SF as well as the national programming and planning prescrip-
tions created for fund absorption have all been frequently modified. Accordingly, 
national and regional practices of adjustment and plan elaboration procedures have 
also changed, and the success of adaptation has varied, too. In principle, EU member 
states have enjoyed greater liberty and have had wider responsibilities since 2007. 
Poland has exploited the opportunity of decentralisation, which the rest of the 
investigated countries have failed to achieve. The institutional changes in the system 
of public administration or regional policy further decreased the chances of pre-
serving and transmitting organisational knowledge, the network of relations and 
also the already established other networks. For instance, the Hungarian regional 
level deprived of functions will not be able to co-ordinate the joint preparations for 
the period starting from 2014; the new method based on the collaboration of county 
municipalities is an utterly new practice rendering access to functioning methods 
and reliable partners difficult. County municipalities are not prepared for this task.  
The partnership principle is a general EU requirement for all of the institutional 
bodies in the SF management system during the whole implementation process. 
However, due to the CEE countries’ traditional, bureaucratic state administration 
system and to their limited experiences in this field, partnership building has been 
a great challenge and it would need a new form of management. There are two ways 
to involve stakeholders in the SF allocation process; the first is when they are mem-
bers of the Monitoring Committees and they monitor the implementation of SF 
funds, and the second, when they can comment on and/or create the sectoral and 
regional programmes of NSRFs.It was common that the biggest, umbrella organisa-
tions were able to exploit the opportunity of the SF consultation processes. The 
involvement of smaller NGOs poses some technical problems when it comes to ex-
panding civil society partnerships in cohesion policy. Local or ad-hoc NGOs often 
lack the resources in terms of personnel and infrastructure to analyse and process 
documentation, and even to have continuous representation in case they participate 
(e.g. voluntary representatives attending meetings) (EP 2008). 
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The biggest challenge and the most difficult task of SF management is to empower 
the final beneficiaries and to give them enough time to learn the processes. The con-
stantly changing conditions, institutions, rules and staff make it practically impos-
sible for the stakeholders involved in the project to accumulate knowledge. The 
elaboration of project proposals has been transferred to the private sector, since the 
institutional system of SF is lacking the necessary capacities. This may be one of the 
underlying reasons why the poorest are the least successful in getting into projects. 
Organisations having insufficient own funds (enterprises, self-governments, civil 
stakeholders) cannot avail themselves of the services of project proposal writing 
companies. 
The effects of political elections and the impacts of the hectically changing public 
administrative system have to be investigated separately. These have affected the 
functioning of the entire institutional system, the internal and external relations as 
well as the communication of regional policy and SF management. For example, in 
Hungary continual personal and institutional changes at the ministries, in addition 
to the unclear division of labour between them, inhibited the operation of bureau-
cratic automatisms, despite the existence of unchanged institutions, such as NDA 
(KPMG 2011). The changing intermediate bodies caused problems in communica-
tion with the stakeholders and beneficiaries, similarly to the effect of erratic com-
munication caused by the fluctuating staff in the SF management organisations. The 
latter can also hinder the accumulation of organisational knowledge, even in a cen-
tralised system like the Hungarian one. The impacts of the governmental change in 
2010 resulted in disrupting sectoral portfolios and the NDA exactly at the time when 
they should have taken part in strategic planning (preparation for the new program-
ming period, rethinking the rules of spending the money under the circumstances of 
the financial crisis and in the light of the mid-term evaluation reports). 
The global financial crisis meant a challenge for all CEE member countries. This 
was manifest, among others, in central budget restrictions which have postponed 
setting significant social, territorial and often economic development priorities, 
have blocked development projects, and reduced the funds owned by local/territo-
rial public administrative units (self-governments). The crisis has placed several 
potential project participants in a hopeless situation, regardless whether they were 
actors financed from public or private funds. From the aspect of SF, it is important 
to note that the exhaustion of national development resources has considerably 
increased the importance of SF, thus the regulation (in certain cases overregulation) 
of SF may further hinder the success of allocation. Overregulation excludes several 
good ideas and potential projects, so that they do not even reach the phase of 
preparing proposals or they fall out in the first round. The last aspect to be con-
sidered is that the financial crisis has raised the risk of accomplishing projects 
successfully in the case of several beneficiaries. 
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Conclusions 
The Visegrad countries have often been treated as a uniform block by EU policies, 
albeit they chose dissimilar paths already in their political-economic transition pe-
riod despite their common historical roots. The individual countries applied varying 
degrees of decentralisation, provided different opportunities for FDI and – as ana-
lysed in this paper – were differently affected by the Europeanisation pressure. 
From among the four examined countries Poland chose a unique path, it has 
accomplished administrative-institutional reforms including decentralisation as 
their integral part. On the contrary, Hungary followed another road, that of recen-
tralisation. The Czech Republic and Slovakia took some steps towards decentralisa-
tion, but the institutional system established to deal with EU funds did not properly 
involve the regional/local participants. 
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A STUDY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABILITY 
IN HARGHITA COUNTY, ROMANIA 
Andrea Csata 
Introduction 
In this paper the impacts of European Union funds on rural areas, more specifically, 
on Harghita County, Romania will be studied. In Romania there are major dif-
ferences among the various parts of the country in attracting European Union funds. 
These differences can be found, on the one hand, in the type of programmes, on the 
other hand, regionally, at the level of development regions and also at county level. 
If we take a look only at the Regional Operational Programme, we can see that its 
operation has not strengthened cohesion so far, especially not in the long-term. 
Thus, in what follows, the local economic impact of several programmes on Harghita 
County will be analysed.       
The main aspect of analysis will be the allocation of rural development funds, but 
I shall also compare the allocation of these funds and the operation of the Regional 
Operational Programme as well as the attraction of agricultural subsidies. The study 
focuses mainly on the economic impact of these funds and on their role in sustaining 
the local economy. 
Rural Areas and European Union Funds 
The development of rural areas cannot be separated from rural activities due to 
their territorial facilities and rural character. In this way, agricultural subsidies play 
an important role in sustainable rural development. Sonnino et al. (2008) have high-
lighted the importance of the sustainable rural development paradigm, as it has the 
potential for a reconstituted agricultural and multi-functional land-based rural sec-
tor. 
Marsden’s study (2003) is also important, as it emphasises that sustainable rural 
development is territorially based and thus it redefines nature by re-emphasising 
food production and agro-ecology, which re-asserts the socio-environmental role of 
agriculture. Marsden also calls our attention to the fact that agriculture is a major 
agent in sustaining rural economies and cultures. 
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Concerning the analysis of the rural development funds’ impacts, I would like to 
mention two major studies that have investigated them.  
In the first one, studying the rural development funding of four development 
regions in the same county, Szőcs et al. (2012) concluded that the economic dimen-
sion had greater effect, while the environmental one was totally neglected. Since 
there are no size limits nor needs set for the territories applying for these funds, 
effectiveness depends on the mayors’ personal and administrative capacity, and 
most of the projects are not really sustainable.  
In the second one, applying the method of input–output analysis, Bíró (2012) 
examined the impact of supports by the Common Agricultural Policy. The results 
show that the Romanian agriculture forestry and fishing sector has an average 
impact on the overall economy, namely increasing the agricultural production with 
1 RON (Romanian currency) means an input demand increase with 1.8089 and an 
output rise with 1.7485.  
 The final increase in agricultural demand by 1 RON leads only to 0.2344 RON 
income growth in the total economy.  
The appreciation of sustainable development is reflected in the Europe 2020 
strategy, the principle aim of which is to be a strategy of smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth. The next planning and budget cycle in rural development also tries 
to operationalise these main strategic aims: promoting transfer of innovation, 
enhancing competitiveness, preserving the ecosystem, emphasising the importance 
of green energy, strengthening social inclusion and reducing poverty. Innovation, 
closer co-operation among agriculture, rural activities and research, and the support 
of young farmers have came into prominence. The ways of co-operation (product 
sales, improving rural services), the LEADER-approach, urban–rural co-operation, 
and renewable energy have all become re-evaluated. 
Research Frameworks 
Our paper analyses the impacts of European Union funds from the perspectives of 
the economy and of  development sustainability. The core analysis deals with the 
distribution and impacts of rural development funds, but in order to provide a com-
parative analysis, other two major funding opportunities – the Regional Operational 
Programme funds and the European Union agricultural subsidies – will also be 
included.  
An attempt will be made to answer the following questions: How efficiently are 
the above-mentioned EU funds utilised at county level, especially in Harghita 
County? How are these funds used? What do they mean for the local economy? What 
do they mean from the perspective of sustainability? How much do they help the 
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convergence and cohesion of the counties included in general, and in the case of 
Harghita County in particular.  
For the purpose of the research basically the data available on the relevant 
agencies’ official websites were used, but additional data from these agencies were 
also requested, namely, from The Payments Agency for Rural Development and 
Fishing (PARDF), the Regional Development Agency and the Agency for Payments 
and Intervention in Agriculture. The data analysed relate to the funds allocated for 
the period 2007 – 1st March 2013. 
Our research focuses on Harghita County, since it is a good subject for analysis in 
respect of rural areas, as more than half of the county’s population live in rural areas 
and according to the National Institute of Statistics this rural population tends to 
increase: (1990: 52.3%, 2010: 56.1%). Population density also shows the charac-
teristics of a rural area: the average for the entire county is 48.9 inhabitants/square 
kilometre, for the rural areas 32.1 and for the urban areas 149.4. 
In 2012 unemployment rate was 5.6% at a national level, 6.4% in the Centre 
Region, while it was 7.5% in Harghita County. Furthermore, the GDP per capita in 
2012 was 4640 EUR in Harghita County, 6018 EUR in the Centre Region, and 6924 
EUR at a national level. Harghita County is an area with low income where the 
annual average take-home pay was 1114 RON in 2012, a sum that is smaller than 
that in the Centre Region (1333 RON) and the national average (1512 RON). The 
county can be characterised as a mainly mountainous region with 59.7% agricul-
tural land – out of which 39.6%  meadows and 37.1% pastures – and 35.7% woods.  
Although most of Harghita county’s localities are considered to be developed and 
highly developed, according to a statement issued by the Centre Development 
Region, only Brasov County precedes Harghita County in development. In Harghita 
County only 16% of the localities can be considered very poor and poor, and more 
than half of them are developed.  
All in all, we can state that Harghita County is highly developed and has a good 
infrastructure in spite of its low income rate. 
Research Results – The Analysis of Rural Development Funds 
When analysing rural development funds, only the funds tendered exclusively by 
the Rural Development Agency (PARDF) were taken into consideration, since the 
211, 212 and 214 actions of the Rural Development Programme belonged to the re-
sponsibility of another institution, the Romanian Agency for Payments and Inter-
vention in Agriculture (APIA). The data of the latter will be analysed later, when pre-
senting the direct agricultural payments.  
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Twelve out of the 20 successful measures were envisaged for competition (out-
side the LEADER axis). Regarding sectorial involvement, the majority was agricul-
tural: 8 agricultural, 2 in tourism, 2 multi-sectorial. As to the beneficiaries, these 
actions were targeted mostly at entrepreneurs dealing with agriculture, tourism, 
other businesses, as well as at local governments, forestry, and joint tenancy. Con-
sidering the objectives and the impacts of these actions, the economic objectives are 
prevalent, then come the environmental ones, while the social objectives are the 
least or only indirectly taken into account.  
Harghita County had an average share from the funds as regards the amounts 
utilised. Surprisingly the counties which performed better were the more developed 
counties from Transylvania (Timis, Cluj, Bihor), and Bistriţa Nasăud and Suceava, 
which are less developed (Figure 1).  
Regarding the amount of funding per capita, the seaside county Tulcea, and Sălaj 
proved to be the best performers, whereas Harghita County shows an average 
performance (Figure 2). 
Considering the number of projects, Harghita County has an average rating, the 
best performers in this case being Alba County and Bistriţa Năsăud (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 1. Share of subsidy per capita of project funds at county level until 
March 2013 
Source: Based on National Rural Development Programme of Romania. 
